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Punishment 
 
Christopher Bennett and Kimberley Brownlee1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Punishment is a burden that some agent with relevant powers deliberately 
imposes on someone else as a purportedly justified response to conduct that she, the 
punishing agent, views as wrong.2 The agent might view the conduct as wrong in 
itself or as wrong simply because it breaches an authoritative rule. But the burden 
imposed on the supposed wrongdoer is normally intended to communicate the 
punisher’s justified condemnation of the wrong in question. The punishing agent not 
only has the power to inflict hard treatment in response to the conduct, but also, 
usually, claims to have the authority – the right – to do so. The punishee is allegedly 
responsible for the (putative) wrong, in the sense of meeting the conditions that would 
make it fair or fitting or otherwise appropriate to impose the punishment – though of 
course he in fact might not be responsible for it. These features – that punishment is 
justified, that the punishing agent has the relevant authority, that those punished are 
responsible – are the sources of the majority of the philosophical issues that arise in 
regard to punishment, and we examine them in more detail in this chapter. 
People impose punishments on each other in various contexts and forms for 
various reasons. For instance, parents may use punishments as a technique in rearing 
their children in order to discipline them, and to teach them what behavior is 
acceptable. Creedal associations such as the Christian Church have sometimes used 
harsh punishments like excommunication or public shaming to condemn members 
whose behavior they could not tolerate. Employers often use punishments – such as 
the denial of promotions or benefits, the assignment of unpopular tasks – to control or 
express disapproval of uncooperative employees. And in intimate relationships with 
friends, family members, partners, and spouses, people often respond to the conduct 
they disapprove of with treatment such as blame, resentment, indignation, anger, 
shaming, and shunning. 
The arena of punishment that will be the focus of this chapter, however, is 
legal punishment. The specific forms that our legal punishments tend to take can be 
viewed against the backdrop of the various, broadly punitive responses that we give to 
each other’s wrongdoing in the non-legal contexts noted above. Those non-legal uses 
of punishment by employers, friends, associations, and families – flawed and 
debatable as they may be – provide us with a rough set of reference points by which 
to judge the credibility, defensibility, and harshness of our legal punishment 
institutions. Those reference points pertain to our motivations and aims in punishing 
each other; the chance that punishing each other in the ways we do will achieve our 
desired aims; and the merits or demerits of alternative responses to wrongdoing.  
Punishment practices vary widely across jurisdictions in how harsh or mild 
they are. For instance, punishment regimes vary in the severity of the punishments 
provided by the criminal law of that jurisdiction (e.g. community service, fines, 
imprisonment, exile, solitary confinement, torture, or even execution); the harshness 
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with which those punishments are administered by officials in that jurisdiction; and 
the flexibility or inflexibility of sentencing practices to attend or not to the particular 
features of a case.3 Anglo-American systems are often said to be harsher along most 
measures than more progressive continental-European systems.4 Further, some 
criminal justice systems allow people to opt for mediation, arbitration, victim 
restitution, and non-punitive restorative justice. Harsh punishments such as long-term 
imprisonment or, worse, solitary confinement tend also to generate distinctive moral 
problems related to slopping out, caging, sexual violence, disease, psychological 
trauma, and the cultivation of survival mechanisms.5  
Of course, the credibility of our legal punishment institutions depends also on 
other factors, such as the level of collateral damage that these institutions can do to 
offenders’ dependents as well as the gravity of any pre-existing social injustices 
whereby some people and communities who already disadvantaged are 
disproportionately affected by the punishment regime.  
Given the problems of punishment regimes, we must confront some basic 
questions about whether we need to punish, and whether our forms of punishment are 
fit for purpose or should be replaced by alternatives. We will shape this Chapter 
around these issues, which can be captured by three questions about the general 
justification of legal punishment: a) Why punish?, b) Who may legitimately punish?, 
and c) Who may legitimately be punished, for what, and how much? We will see that 
the answers to these questions depend on the philosophical approach one takes to the 
overall justifiability of punishment. 
 
2. Why punish? 
In this section we look at the main routes by which theorists attempt to justify 
the practice of legal punishment. These are only potential justifications: that is to say, 
the conditions that theorists have put forward under which a society’s intentional and 
authoritative infliction of hard treatment on human beings could be justified. We 
should be wary of accepting these considerations for two reasons. First, we should be 
aware of our tendency to be biased toward the status quo. Since we are familiar with 
the practice of punishment we may be inclined to conclude too quickly that it is 
necessary and defensible. Second, because the consequences of punishment are so 
drastic, we should pay particular attention to the validity of theorists’ claims to have 
shown that practice to be morally acceptable. 
We can begin by categorizing accounts of the justification of punishment as 
forward-looking, backward-looking or some combination of the two. Theories of 
punishment are either pure, and hence purely forward-looking or purely backward-
looking, or else hybrid, in which case they contain some mixture of forward- and 
backward-looking justifications.  
The forward-looking justifications comprise attempts to justify punishment by 
claiming that some future good is best realized (or made more likely) by punishing. 
The backward-looking accounts, by contrast, claim that there is something about the 
criminal or wrongful action itself, as we look back at it, that requires punishment as 
an appropriate response, regardless of whether punishment is the best available means 
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to realize some future good. The crucial difference between the two types of accounts 
is that forward-looking justifications require evidence that punishment is the best 
available means to realize some desired end, whatever that end is, and backward-
looking justifications require instead some argument that punishment is somehow 
inherently fitting as a response to crime or wrongdoing.  
For instance, the claim that punishment is justified because it deters crime, and 
thereby reduces harm and makes people safer, is a forward-looking justification. To 
show that punishment would be justified in these terms, we would need to look at 
whether there are more effective and less harmful ways to increase people’s safety 
than by punishment (such as pre-emptive measures like increasing policing, 
improving education, reducing social inequality, or becoming a less acquisitive 
society).  
By contrast, the view that punishment is justified because wrongs done to one 
person need to be avenged on the perpetrator in like manner and extent (something 
like ‘an eye for an eye’) is a backward-looking justification since it relies on 
normative claims about the necessity and proper mode of avenging wrongdoing, 
rather than on empirical evidence about how likely it is that punishment will lead to 
some desired future state.  
Backward-looking justifications might seem to have their own end in view, 
that is, their own forward-looking aim, which is to avenge the victim or to take 
revenge against the wrongdoer.  The reason that such views are nonetheless well-
characterized as backward-looking is that the wrong done is the essential reference 
point by which to determine what kind of punitive response is justified.   
If we look more closely at forward-looking justifications, we can ask what 
kinds of important ends punishment could be thought to serve. We have already seen 
that one answer is deterrence and the contribution deterrence makes to security. This 
is in fact the overwhelmingly most popular answer – that punishment is necessary 
because of the contribution it makes to peace, security, and people’s ability to plan 
their lives into the future without threat from those more powerful than themselves. 
Other related ends that are often identified are rehabilitation, education, reconciliation 
and forgiveness.  
We can note a number of common criticisms of forward-looking theories. 
First of all, it is not normally thought to be legitimate to inflict suffering on people in 
order to further important social ends. Rather, people are thought to have stringent 
rights to non-interference and self-determination. If that were right, then we would 
need to show that, in order to be permissibly punished, someone would have to be 
shown to have lost or forfeited that right to non-interference or non-punishment. But, 
this means that forward-looking views would have to incorporate something 
backward-looking, showing why it is that those people who have committed certain 
wrongs thereby lose or forfeit their rights. This suggests that theories with a forward-
looking element might have to be hybrid theories. Examples of such hybrid theories 
might be those that aim to model justified punishment on self- and other-defence, 
where there is likewise a claim that, in launching an unjustified attack on another 
person, one alters one’s own moral immunity to an aggressive response.  
Secondly, and leading on from this, it might be argued that, without a 
backward-looking element, forward-looking theories will be unable to explain why it 
is important to punish only the guilty. If, in some circumstance, the relevant valuable 
social end can be furthered most effectively by punishing an innocent person; and if it 
is the effective pursuit of that valuable social end that is sufficient to justify 
punishment, as the forward-looking views suggest, then the punishment of an 
innocent person would be justified. However, given that we should reject this 
conclusion – surely the punishment of the innocent is unacceptable – the premises 
must be mistaken.  
Thirdly, because, in the end, forward-looking justifications are hostage to 
empirical evidence about the effectiveness of punishment to achieve certain goals, as 
compared to alternative ways of bringing about those goals, there is always scope for 
criticism that the evidence shows otherwise. Although at some level it seems 
commonsensical to say that, if we threaten rational agents with a bad consequence if 
they decide to opt for some proscribed action, then that will reduce the likelihood of 
their doing that action, the evidence that punishment deters is actually very unclear.6 
Furthermore, as proponents of informal justice point out, a large number of 
criminalisable actions are never reported – perhaps far more than are reported – and 
are hence dealt with within communities and families without every formally being 
labelled as crimes. If this is true, it gives the lie to the view that the threat of 
punishment is necessary to maintain social order. 
Turning now to criticisms of backward-looking justifications, as the label 
suggests, backward-looking justifications do not claim to bring about any future good, 
and for many people this is precisely their weakness.7 These justifications seem to be 
suggesting that we make someone suffer – indeed, that we pour huge amounts of 
public money into maintaining expensive social institutions to make large numbers of 
often already disadvantaged people suffer – for no good end. For this reason, the 
backward-looking views are often portrayed as barbaric, as giving vent to a cruel or 
vindictive aspect of human nature that we should be looking to overcome, or as rooted 
in an outdated cosmology of good and evil, heaven and hell. To compound the 
problem, many think that these backward-looking justifications would only make 
sense if human beings had free will. After all, if human beings are not free to comply 
with moral standards for the reason that they are causally determined to act as they 
do, how can they be fairly punished for failing to comply?8  
Nevertheless there are many who continue to see backward-looking 
justifications for punishment as having some resonance. The ways in which they have 
tried to articulate the backward-looking justification that punishment is an inherently 
fitting response to wrongdoing fall into three categories.  
First of all, there are those who claim that there is an abstract moral principle 
according to which justice should be done against wrongdoers, in the name of those 
wronged – and specifically that doing justice requires punishment directed at the evil 
will of the wrongdoer in order to vindicate the victim.9 While this route has the virtue 
of tying punishment to moral seriousness – upholding moral standards and showing 
concern for the rights and status of the victim as one to whom this should not have 
been done – the crucial thing is whether these views can really show that such moral 
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seriousness requires punishment, and that an unwillingness to punish involves in 
some way condoning or acquiescing in the initial wrongdoing by failing to stand up 
for the victim.  
Secondly, there are those who claim that punishment, or close analogues to 
punishment, are found in everyday interpersonal relations when we criticize, blame 
and get angry with one another, and generally hold one another to account for what 
we take to be important moral standards of behavior and concern.10 Thus, it might be 
argued, we have firmly embedded intuitions that moral criticism, remorse and 
apologies are fitting responses to wrongs, not just when they are the most effective 
way to realize some future good, but, for backward-looking reasons, in order to 
acknowledge properly the seriousness of the wrong.11 Yet these practices of 
accountability are rarely targeted as being cruel or barbaric. The critic might 
nevertheless argue that our practices of accountability are in fact unacceptable; or that 
formal types of punishment are too far removed from those practices to be justified by 
analogy with them.  
Thirdly, there are those who take a specifically political route in attempting to 
make a backward-looking justification plausible. This would be the claim that 
punishment is necessary as part of political society: for instance, as part of the 
authority of the state to make law and to set boundaries to permissible actions. If there 
were no such thing as punishment to mark a violation of these boundaries, it might be 
said, the authority of the state would amount to nothing.12 Therefore, the state needs a 
right to punish, on this type of view, not in order to vindicate the rights of the victim, 
but in order to vindicate its own rights as the agency that has the final say in how 
citizens are permitted to act.  
  
3. Who Has the Right to Punish?  
Some theorists argue that, in order to justify punishment, it is not enough to 
show that punishment either brings about some good, such as crime control, or 
responds appropriately to a wrong by imposing deserved censure. It is also necessary 
to show that the party who punishes has a right to punish the person she punishes. 
There are two aspects to such a right. First, something must be true of the party who is 
doing the punishing; it is not the case that just anyone can punish just any wrongdoer 
if they have the opportunity to do so. Second, something must be true of the person to 
be punished; as just noted, in general, people have a right against being used without 
their consent even if using them would bring about some good, because people have 
strong rights to self-determination/non-interference, and therefore the person to be 
punished must have lost or forfeited certain rights by their wrongdoing. We will focus 
on the necessary features of the punisher in the current section and on the necessary 
features of the punishee in Section 4.  
 Theorists who argue that the state and its relevantly placed officials have a 
right, indeed an exclusive right, to punish must respond to several objections. One 
such objection is that states are usually engaged in worse conduct than that for which 
they would seek to hold their citizens to account. If tu quoque arguments are credible, 
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then, on this argument, the state and its officers are not in a position to condemn 
people for doing some of what the state itself is doing.  
A second objection is that the state and its officials lack the standing to 
punish.13 The strongest version of this objection says that no human being or 
institution has the standing to punish another human being. In Herman Bianchi’s 
words:   
 
The very thought that one grown up human being should ever have a right, or 
duty, to punish another grown up human being is a gross moral indecency, and 
the phenomenon cannot stand up to any ethical test.14 
 
In this kind of view, vengeance, retribution, and punitive threats, if they belong to 
anyone, properly belong to God alone, and therefore only God has the standing to 
condemn and punish people for their conduct. A less radical version of the objection 
states that vengeance can properly belong to human beings, but it belongs to victims 
and their affiliates, not to the state, and therefore only victims have a right to punish 
the people who wrong them. Victims could delegate that right to a third-party such as 
the state, but they need not do so. A third version of the objection challenges the 
victim’s exclusive right to punish while still denying that the state has the exclusive 
right. This view holds that everyone has a natural executive right to punish people for 
wrongdoing. Here, ‘everyone’ includes the state, but the state is not the only party 
with the right to call people to account for criminal wrongdoing within its 
jurisdiction.15  
Some responses to these objections are voluntaristic, and some are non-
voluntaristic. The theorists who give a voluntaristic argument for the state’s exclusive 
right to punish either root that right in people’s explicit or implicit contractual 
arrangements with the state, which transfer to it the rights they would naturally have 
to punish each other for wrongdoing, or, less contentiously, root that right in citizens’ 
on-going democratic endorsement of the state’s punishment practices.16  
Theorists who give a non-voluntaristic explanation root the state’s exclusive 
right to punish in the public goods that are derived from the state having an exclusive 
right. Some argue that the state must have an exclusive right to punish because only 
that arrangement maintains the link between the state’s judgment that some action is 
wrong and the appropriateness of the state inflicting a certain sanction and mode of 
suffering on an offender.17 Others focus on the state’s relative effectiveness and truth-
seeking ability in criminal justice matters. They claim that formal, institutional 
processes and procedures are, under certain conditions, more reliable than private 
exercises of judgement, and, for that reason, both criminal justice officials and 
ordinary citizens should follow the rules of legal punishment even when, on occasion, 
                                                        
13 Cf. R. A. Duff (2006), Answering for Crime. Oxford: Hart; and J. Gardner (2003), ‘The Mark of 
Responsibility’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 23, pp. 157-71.  
14 H. Bianchi(1994), ‘Abolition: Assensus and Sanctuary’, A Reader on Punishment. R. A. Duff and D. 
Garland (eds.), Oxford University Press, ch. 15. See also H. Bianchi (1994), Justice as Sanctuary: 
Toward a New System of Crime Control, Indiana University Press. 
15 For a defence of this Lockean view, see C. H. Wellman (forthcoming), Rights Forfeiture and 
Punishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch 3.  
16 Cf. R. Dagger (2010-11), ‘Social Contracts, Fair Play, and the Justifications of Punishment’ in Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law, 8, pp. 341-368.  
17 A. Harel (2008), ‘Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case against Privately 
Inflicted Sanctions’, Legal Theory, 14, pp. 113–133. 
the institutional criminal justice process arrives at the wrong conclusion.18  
A more general account of the state’s exclusive right to punish is rooted in the 
distinctive aims of legal punishment, which include, as discussed above, 1) retributive 
justice, 2) general deterrence, 3) moral education, 4) the expression of certain societal 
values, 5) the restoration of victims, and 6) the release of socially-disruptive tensions. 
The most notable aim, some argue, is deterrence: circumstances would deteriorate 
rapidly if the state did not insert itself with these six aims and, particularly, the aim of 
deterring.19 
Of course, even if the state were to achieve these aims best, that would not 
automatically give it an exclusive right to punish. What gives it that right, some argue, 
is the importance of the aims in question. That is, given the grave risks and high 
stakes for both people and society, criminal justice and punishment are from other 
political issues and this explains why the state’s right to respond must prevail over 
individuals’ rights to answer certain wrongs done to them.20 
 That said, we could make a similar claim about childrearing, that it is 
fundamentally important to get it right since the stakes are high and the risks are 
grave. Would this justify allocating childrearing rights exclusively to those people 
who are best placed to rear children well, which often may not be the biological 
parents? Surely not. A redistributive childrearing scheme is highly counterintuitive. 
Therefore, by analogy, we may question whether importance is sufficient to give the 
(legitimate) state an exclusive right to punish. 
Moreover, even if states are best-placed, in principle, to achieve the important 
aims of punishment, they do not necessarily achieve those aims best or well through 
the kinds of punishment practices that they currently use, especially in Anglo-
American systems where punishment is practised in harsh ways that include, in 
addition to fines and community service, public shaming, incarceration, mandatory 
minimum sentences, life sentences, life sentences without parole, and, in some 
jurisdictions, solitary confinement, severe physical strain, and execution. These are 
the practices that are openly acknowledged to be part of the legal punishment regime. 
With them comes a host of incidental, accidental, careless, and unacknowledged 
burdens that seem to be part of doing punitive business. First, punitive practices often 
deny people the freedom to pursue and maintain an ordinary family life as well as 
rights to care for others, to have privacy, and to exercise a meaningful degree of 
associative control. Second, in consequence, punitive practices harm offenders’ 
dependents and associates by severing their social bonds. Third, practices often 
stigmatise, blame, shame, and dehumanise offenders; label them for life as crooks, 
jailbirds, and criminals; expose them to the risks of disease, injury, violence, and 
sexual abuse; use them as a means for cheap or free labour; and deny them personal 
control, respect, and self-respect.  
Although some theorists, and politicians, view burdens such as stigmatisation 
and comprehensive rights-forfeiture as core aspects of legitimate punishment,21 many 
theorists wish to see punishment practised in humane ways. The benefits that harsh 
measures purport to achieve could possibly be approximated, achieved, or optimised 
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through more humane measures.22 More modest punishment practices or non-punitive 
institutions, such as mediation, arbitration, education, health, housing and work, 
might secure these aims better than our present punishment practices. Most thinkers 
also recognise that, possibly, the purported benefits of any form of punitive hard 
treatment could be less important than other benefits that we could secure by 
prioritising other objectives. 
Additional, more general questions about the state’s standing to punish include 
the following: Could any state assert an exclusive right to punish or must it satisfy 
certain criteria of democratic, liberal legitimate authority and normative power to 
enact criminal law? Must its criminal law coincide to a reasonable degree with 
objectively correct moral standards? Must it serve all of its citizens equally well, 
giving them a genuinely good chance, at least, of avoiding breaching the law? Must it 
punish fairly and equitably? Theorists who wish to defend the use of punishment as it 
is practised in societies like ours must explain why a state need not meet all of these 
criteria, since few if any real states do. 
 
4. Who may legitimately be punished, for what, and how much? 
The second condition on the state’s right to punish pertains to features of the 
person to be punished. Even if the state has an exclusive right to punish, that does not 
entail a right to punish all people who do criminal wrong and can be punished for it. 
Theorists of punishment must answer several questions, such as: Who is liable to 
punishment? What should the conditions of culpability be? Can we be punished for 
actions only, or also emotions and thought? Can we be punished for acts (actus reus) 
alone, or only with accompanying mental states (mens rea)?23 
The answers to these questions will be different depending on what we think 
are the ends at which punishment properly aims. On a purely forward-looking crime 
control model such as the deterrence view, a punishment being an efficient way of 
reducing crime is a sufficient condition of justification. But this seems to mean that 
there is no requirement of individual culpability. Little or even no degree of 
culpability might be compatible with liability to punishment: it depends on what is 
most efficient. That is why the forward-looking view is compatible with strict liability 
(actus reus only), or even, as we saw above, with the punishment of the innocent (i.e. 
not even the actus reus). The reasons for thinking that individual culpability, with the 
familiar pattern of excuses, is necessary would be empirical reasons, namely, that 
restricting punishment to a certain construction of individual culpability best serves 
crime reduction aims. This might be the case, for instance, if, following Jeremy 
Bentham, we take it that people who commit crimes unintentionally are less likely to 
be dangerous, and therefore less in need of deterrence, than those who commit them 
intentionally. 
By contrast, on a backward-looking view that sees individual wrongdoing as 
ceteris paribus sufficient to justify punishment, it is also a necessary condition of 
punishment being justified that the individual have done (moral) wrong. So fault of 
some kind is necessary and the liability cannot be strict. On this view, the action has 
to manifest some form of ill will or moral failing in the agent – disrespect for the law 
or disrespect for moral standards, or for the interests of the victims of the action – in 
order for it to be the case that justice requires punishment. This in turn requires some 
type of freedom of will – for the action must really represent the person’s will and not 
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of crime and recidivism, see Whitman, Harsh Justice. 
23 [CROSS-REF to Holton chapter?] 
simply be the effect of an accident, a mental illness, or justifiable ignorance, all of 
which are compatible with the agent’s orientation to the relevant moral standards 
being impeccable. There is room for a range of views here regarding what it means 
for the agent’s action to represent their attitudes, and what kinds of impairments we 
should accept in overlooking some of an agent’s attitudes as being products more of 
circumstance than their own ‘deep self.’24 At present, the key point is that the 
justification of backward-looking punishment requires some conception of moral 
responsibility that provide those conditions of agency that have to be met for 
punishment to be an inherently fitting response.  
There are two types of hybrid theories that we can quickly note. The first is 
principally a forward-looking view, but one that acknowledges moral values other 
than the imperative to maximise overall social good. For instance, if there were 
deontological constraints of some sort that rule out treating individuals as a mere 
means to an end then it might be that offenders would have to be morally culpable 
before it can become permissible to use their punishment to deter others. This 
combination of moral responsibility with forward-looking aims is characteristic of 
‘negative retributivism’ – the view that individual wrongdoing makes a person liable 
to punishment, but denies that such punishment is inherently fitting; if there is to be 
punishment, it must only be because it serves forward-looking ends to do so. The 
second view is based on H. L. A. Hart’s position in his classic paper, ‘Legal 
Responsibility and Excuses’.25 Here the idea is that individual culpability is 
important, not because retributive desert is important, but rather because it allows a 
basically forward-looking crime control institution to make room for individual 
freedom by ensuring that the individual has some control over whether they are liable 
to punishment. Hart argues that the significance of non-strict liability conditions – 
which effectively require some voluntary action in order to incur liability – is that 
they mean that one must act voluntarily to incur liability, and hence retain freedom to 
avoid punishment. If liability is strict one cannot determine what might happen that 
will incur a risk of punishment, and Hart saw such a prospect as an unjustifiable 
restriction on individual freedom. Hart’s model therefore supports non-strict liability 
without agreeing with the retributivist claim that through wrongdoing a person 
inherently changes their moral liability to be harmed. 
 To be plausible, the above models must be reconciled with various intuitions 
about liability to punishment. For instance, there is a commonsense intuition that 
young children, people with severe cognitive impairments, and people who have 
committed no crime are not liable to punishment. There is also a settled range of 
justifications and excuses such as self-defence, provocation/loss of control, duress and 
so on. 
There is another commonsense intuition that people who repent, apologise, 
and seek to make amends for their wrongdoing prior to being punished should not be 
viewed in the same light as people who are unrepentant about their wrongdoing. If 
severity of a wrong can be lessened through repentance and repair, and if punishments 
are meant to track the general aims that purport to justify them, then oftentimes we 
should punish repentant offenders less than otherwise, if at all, since most of the 
declared aims of punishment will have been achieved prior to punishing them.  
Another intuition that many have is that people who live in criminogenic 
conditions – such as persecution or poverty or environments where violence among 
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young males is the norm – due to distributive or structural injustice and who are more 
likely to commit crimes as a result of that, are less culpable than offenders who have 
committed the same crimes but did not inhabit the same conditions and, hence, the 
former should be deemed less liable to punishment.26  
As we said at the outset of this section, views of liability dovetail with views 
of the overall purpose of punishment. One way to adjudicate among the various 
forward- and backward-looking views of punishment is to ask which gives the most 
plausible answer to the question of what would justify punishment. But also relevant 
is its corollary view on the conditions of liability. For instance, if we have the 
intuition that remorse or criminogenic upbringing is relevant to reducing liability, 
could this be because, as it happens, punishing such people is less likely to reduce 
crime? Or is it simply a firm intuition that such people deserve less punishment 
because their actions do not show such flagrant disregard of morality as they would 
have shown if they had been performed in the absence of remorse or criminogenic 
upbringing? 
 
5. Alternatives to Punishment  
We end this chapter by looking at alternatives to punishment. Although we 
have followed the contours of traditional ethical debates about punishment by looking 
at how rather than whether punishment can be justified, we would like to make it clear 
that it is very much a live question whether it can be. This is a possibility that tends to 
be overlooked. Even though philosophers will often say that their attempts to justify 
punishment build it in as a structural presupposition that such attempts may fail, far 
more intellectual effort is spent on justifying punishment than in coming up with 
realistic alternatives.  
For this reason, there is nothing like the same well-versed literature on 
alternatives to punishment. However, we would like to set out the argumentative 
strategies that are open to abolitionists, and what they would need to show in order to 
make a success of their case. Some who reject punishment and its alternatives might 
do so because they think that punishment could never be justified, at least not for 
beings like us. Whereas for others, it might be that punishment is unjustified because 
of the way society and its particular forms of punishment are – though this might 
change. This latter, less radical, view might be compared to what is called ‘contingent 
pacifism’ – the view that pacifism is required, not because the use of lethal force in 
self-defence is always unjustified, but rather because the realities of modern warfare 
mean that there is no way of realistically discriminating between innocent and non-
innocent, or simply repelling an unjustified attack. Related to punishment, this 
‘contingent abolitionism’ might be the view that, given the prison-industrial complex 
and the nexus between democratic politics and law and order, there is no realistic way 
in which punishment could be carried out in a justifiable manner in our societies.  
How would one go about arguing for the stronger conclusion that punishment 
is in principle unjustified? The arguments for alternatives to punishment tend to 
mirror the attempted justifications that we have looked at in previous sections. As we 
have seen, in order for a particular act of state punishment to be justified, it would 
have to be the case that punishment serves an important aim, and that there are no 
better, less harmful ways to serve that aim; that the agency carrying out the 
punishment has the right to do so; and that the capacities of the agent to be punished 
are such as to make the punishment fair or deserved or otherwise justified. These 
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conditions are each necessary and jointly sufficient. This means that a proponent of 
alternatives to punishment need only show that the case for punishment is vulnerable 
on any one of these grounds in order to show that some alternative is called for.  
 Are the vivid measures of punishment really necessary for societies like ours 
to convey effectively that certain behaviours are prohibited and that the people who 
engage in them must undertake to repent, apologise, and restore relations? Or, are 
there other equally credible or more credible mechanisms for restoring and repairing 
wrongs, such as victim restitution? Additionally, are there less costly mechanisms by 
which to influence and guide people’s behaviour than through the threat of 
punishment? 
Some possibilities that theorists are currently exploring include nudging, 
social pressure, status, and cultural norms.27 Such social influences can affect how we 
view the demands of the law because the demandingness of a norm, rule, or law is not 
a fixed quantity. It is elastic and depends greatly on our circumstances, or what 
psychologists call situationism.28 We tend to want what the people around us want 
and have. Hence, the demandingness of following the law, or of apologising and 
remedying a wrong when we breach the law, can diminish for us when our 
surrounding infrastructure, habituation, and concerns about status all support law-
abidance. In short, if we can change relevant social norms and attitudes about the law, 
we can make it less demanding to follow the law.  
Attending to our situated position generates a response to theorists who argue 
that blame and resentment are natural and appropriate responses to wrongful 
behaviour. If these responses are natural (that is to say, typical) and appropriate, they 
are not the only responses that are natural and appropriate. Compassion, forgiveness, 
kindness, and mercy are also natural and appropriate responses to wrongdoing, 
especially when we remember that we are all fallible, predictably irrational human 
beings who are likely to respond in aggressive, acquisitive, or self-protective ways 
when confronted with certain kinds of stresses. To appreciate the appropriateness of 
compassionate responses, we would need to adjust our social norms surrounding 
crime and punishment.  
In our present society, such an adjustment would amount to something of a 
moral revolution. But, moral revolutions can happen, and sometimes can happen 
quickly. As Kwame Anthony Appiah observes, within a generation, China gave up 
the practice of foot-binding and English gentlemen gave up duelling as a way to 
defend their honour. In both cases, the societies in question came to care about how 
the practices made them look. Foot-binding came to be viewed as a stain on the 
national honour of China. Duelling came to seem ridiculous to aristocrats as a way to 
defend their honour.29 A similar moral revolution might be possible in our responses 
to criminal wrongdoing if we came to view our contemporary practices as 
dishonorable. Such a revolution could take various forms. One option is that we do 
away with everything associated with punishment. As previously noted, some 
communities, including some legal jurisdictions, have adopted non-punitive, 
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restorative responses such as healing rituals, victim-offender mediation, restorative 
probation, and family group conferences.30 
Another option is to try to find institutional forms of punishment that better do 
justice to the spirit of those responses to wrongdoing that we find important in 
ordinary interpersonal relationships, such as educating, airing legitimate grievances, 
restoring relations, and improving cooperation and cohesion. Measures that might 
support these aims best are formal condemnation without punitive hard treatment, 
compulsory victim restitution, sanctuary, and community service. In moving toward 
such approaches, we might nonetheless have to retain a set of harsher measures with 
which to respond to ‘dangerous’ offenders for whom preventive detention will be 
necessary; whether such detention would be a punishment or not depends, in part, on 
our intentions. A related alternative is to do away with criminal justice altogether and 
replace it with a combination of private law measures and mediation, retaining a small 
preventive detention resource for deployment against the relatively small number of 
persistent offenders who cannot be expected to ‘go straight’ once they leave their 
early twenties. 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have surveyed the main considerations that are identified as 
legitimate aims pursued through the criminal justice system. These include 
deterrence, incapacitation, reform, retribution, victim-restoration, security, moral 
education, the expression of certain societal values, and the release of disruptive 
tensions. We have noted some of the key objections against forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of the justification of punishment. We have also identified 
specific conditions that both the punisher and the punishee must satisfy in order for 
punishment to be legitimate. 
 
                                                        
30 J. Braithwaite (2002), ‘Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice,’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 
8, pp. 115–31. 
